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WORLD BANK AND FINANCING GLOBAL HEALTH
Will markets be master or servant to health at the World
Bank?
Reconciling public health goals with its market orientation remains a challenge
Suerie Moon director of research 1, Gorik Ooms professor of global health law and governance 2
1Global Health Centre, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, Geneva, Switzerland; 2London School of Hygiene and Tropical
Medicine, London, UK
In the 18 years since a six part series by Abbasi in The BMJ
argued that the World Bank merits greater attention from the
health community, the institution has received little scrutiny
from global health scholars.1 This is despite its substantial and
growing role in the health sector. A recently published series
of articles by Sridhar and colleagues does much to fill this gap.2-6
The authors paint a detailed picture of the bank’s historical
activities, growing investments, and considerable evolution in
its approaches to health. They also critically analyse more recent
developments. Whether considering the growth of health related
trust funds at the bank,3 its role in universal health coverage,4
the recently launched global financing facility for women and
children’s health,5 or the pandemic emergency financing facility,6
the series persistently grapples with two key questions: firstly,
can the bank’s market oriented approach be consistent with
health equity objectives such as the globally endorsed goal of
universal health coverage? Secondly, how can the bank’s
immense economic and intellectual power be appropriately
governed?
Policy change
In the 1980s and ’90s the World Bank “advised, and sometimes
even forced”2 developing countries to cut public investment in
health systems by making loans conditional on structural
adjustment programmes and encouraging healthcare user fees
that restricted access for poor people.7 8 The bank has since
distanced itself from these policies—for example, when its
president, Jim Yong Kim, rejected user fees as “unjust and
unnecessary” in a 2013 speech to the World Health Assembly.9
With the bank now poised to invest $16bn (£12bn; €14bn) in
health systems in low and middle income countries over the
next five years, it is expected to be a major force in the global
drive for universal health coverage.
Health equity and market solutions?
Yet lingering unease may remain about the powerful institution
whose policy advice—however well intentioned4—weakened
health systems, the effects of which are felt to this day. In his
2017 report to the UN Human Rights Council, independent
expert Alfred de Zayas catalogued a broad range of human rights
concerns linked to the bank’s activities. In the health sector,
those concerns have centred on the International Finance
Corporation (IFC), a $92bn arm of the World Bank with the
goal to “create markets to broaden the reach and impact of
private sector solutions.”10
A 2014 Oxfam analysis found that the IFC’s $1bn Health in
Africa initiative, which channels capital to healthcare firms, had
primarily targeted wealthy and middle class people—for
example, by investing in costly urban hospitals.11 Through its
advisory work, the IFC also supported an agreement between
the government of Lesotho and a private firm to build and
operate a new hospital in the capital city; although the hospital
achieved important service improvements,12 it also consumed
over half the annual health budget and squeezed out spending
for more basic health services for rural poor citizens, while
expecting to pay attractive returns to private investors.13
Sridhar and colleagues concluded: “The World Bank Group
more broadly is reinventing itself, from a lender for major
development projects to a broker for private sector investment.”2
Yet there is no consensus on the appropriate role of for-profit
firms—whether private health insurance, private investment in
health infrastructure, or private healthcare provision—in
achieving universal health coverage. In the conclusions to an
expansive study published in 2000, when Kim co-led the
non-governmental organisation Partners in Health, he and
colleagues argued that “privatization of healthcare will likely
amplify existing social inequities in poor countries.”14 Indeed,
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governments are unlikely to achieve universal health coverage
if the Lesotho case is replicated.
Furthermore, governments require adequate tax revenue to
finance universal health coverage,15 which is expected to require
an additional $274-$371bn a year by 2030.16 Yet firms that
collectively had received 84% of IFC investments in
sub-Saharan Africa had avoided paying taxes through offshore
tax havens.17 Furthermore, the bank’s influential annual “Doing
Business” report, which ranks countries on the environments
they create for private sector operations, rewards countries that
lower their tax burdens. How can all of the lending, investment,
and policy advice across the vast organisation that is the World
Bank consistently support governments in achieving health
equity?
Governance
This brings us to governance. Voting power at the bank can be
characterised as “one dollar, one vote,” in contrast to the
situation in UN agencies (such as the World Health
Organization), which generally operate on “one country, one
vote.” The power that the bank’s voting structure gives to its
largest donors has long been a sore point, most recently for
emerging economies, which have sought to increase their voting
weights or create alternative institutions in response. Winters
and Sridhar point out that the growth of trust funds at the bank
further tightens the control wielded by a few donors, since such
funds do not fall within the ambit of the bank’s standard priority
setting or accountability mechanisms.3
Among donors, the US government has a dominant role. It holds
the single largest voting share, can veto any major decision, and
has always appointed the president through an unwritten
agreement. At a time when the right to health is under constant
attack by the party in power in Washington, aligning all parts
of the bank around a vision of universal quality healthcare may
be even more difficult.
The size and complexity of an institution such as the World
Bank cannot be captured easily. This series will inform and
inspire new efforts among scholars to examine the influence of
this central actor in the global health system. Whether and how
the bank’s market orientation can be reconciled with public
health goals, and how the bank’s considerable financial and
intellectual power can best be governed to do so, remain key
questions to be addressed.
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